

The Localisation of the Humanitarian Supply Chain: Global, Kenya, and Nigeria

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Glossary

AAN – Action Aid Nigeria.

ALTP – Action Localisation Through Partnership.

BAY – Three north-east states in Nigeria; Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe.

CBPFs – OCHA Country-Based Pooled Funds.

CP AoR – The Global Child Protection Area of Responsibility.

CSOs – Civil Society Organisations.

DAC – Development Assistance Committees; main donors of Global North in OECD.

DONOR-RECIPIENT MODEL – a standardised approach to humanitarian development where donor interests, primarily international institutions (INGOs), lead development processes because of donor interests.

EAC – East African Community.

ECOWAS – Economic Community of Western African States.

GBV – Gender-Based Violence.

HSC – Humanitarian Supply-Chain.

HSCM – Humanitarian Supply-Chain Management

IDP – Internally Displaced Person.

INGOs – International Non-Government Organisations.

LNGOs – Local Non-Governmental Organisations.

MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières.

NIF – Nigeria INGO Forum.

NORCAP – Norwegian Response Capacity Action Plan.

NTBs – Non-Tariff Barriers.

ODA - Official Development Assistance.

RCRCM – The Red Cross Red Crescent Movement.

UNFPA Nigeria – United Nation’s Population Fund.

UNICEF – United Nation’s Children’s Emergency Fund.

UNOCHA – United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

USAID – United States Agency for International Development.

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Executive Summary

Localisation is the journey to the optimal destination for development practitioners: a locally led humanitarian supply chain. Although Covid-19 highlighted structural inequalities in the international system, namely the control of the supply chain by international actors, the shift to humanitarian assistance and its localisation can be traced to the period after the Cold War. Humanitarian intervention gained traction, during U.S unipolarity, although the outcomes of such intervention demanded the consultation of local actors at the national, regional, and local level. The crises of Covid-19, however, shifted the approach to humanitarian assistance because consulting local actors is not enough; local actors need to lead the decision-making to respond effectively to humanitarian challenges. Decision-making power, therefore, became the key determiner of 'localisation.'

This report conceptualises localisation and applies this conceptual framework to the three cases: the global level and two national cases within their regional context, namely, Kenya in East Africa and Nigeria in West Africa. The report aims to recommend policy solutions to the humanitarian challenges facing localisation at a global and national level in all three contexts.

Divided into six sections, the key takeaways from each section are followed:

Section 2 of the report sets out the conceptual framework of localisation. Localisation is a response to the asymmetric power dynamics between the Global North and Global South: a journey to the solution of fixing an unequal power relationship. Localisation is therefore conceptualised as a journey to a locally led humanitarian supply-chain where local actors have key decision-making power on the *three levers of localisation*: funding, capacity, and agency.

Section 3 of the report outlines the humanitarian challenges facing Africa and trends in localisation to 'localise' in Kenya and Nigeria. Africa has the highest level of 'risk' because of geophysical and anthropogenic vulnerabilities. Food insecurity is a shared challenge, across East and West Africa, however, the climate-security nexus lends itself to a high frequency of resource-driven conflicts in West Africa. Localisation practises tackle such issues, yet localising is comprehensive in Kenya albeit primitive and asymmetric in Nigeria because of reoccurring issues of funding LNGOs and the framing of civil conflict in the north-east compared to the north-west of Nigeria.

Section 4 of the report analyses the localisation practises of international actors at a global level.

Localisation, at a global level, is conducted by three actors at two levels: the bi/multi-lateralism (national governments) and the intermediaries (INGOs and IGOs). Bilateral actors and multilateral forums prioritise funding and capacity-building whereas intermediaries focus on funding. International actors must build on the limitations of funding and capacity practises whilst all actors must evaluate ‘agency’ to improve their localisation practises.

Section 5 of the report recommends policy proposals for international actors at three levels:

International actors must pursue a systematic shift in the approach to localisation at a global level. ‘Agency’ must be at the forefront of development initiatives in addition to funding and capacity. Funding and capacity must be acknowledged as pre-requisites to full localisation where ‘agency’ is often viewed as an outcome of there being funding and capacity to support initiatives that harness ‘agency.’

Regional integration is necessary in East and West Africa to solve logistical and climate-related issues that prohibit the supply-chain of humanitarian assistance in northern Kenya and north-east/west Nigeria.

National recommendations for international actors in Kenya underline the importance for resource efficiency, capacity-building, and agency for local actors whilst in Nigeria international actors should focus on the funding strategy at the national and local level to address the immediate challenges of the conflict-climate nexus: the core barrier to any localisation efforts in Nigeria.

The journey to a locally led humanitarian supply chain differs between Kenya and Nigeria where Kenya is at a later journey to localisation efforts than Nigeria, despite similar humanitarian challenges, between both countries.

Section 6 concludes:

Supply-chains require funding and capacity to operate, to scale up the supply of relief to communities affected by natural disasters, however, the way policy-makers scale-up the supply of humanitarian relief is fundamental if policymakers are to make humanitarian supply-chain truly ‘local’ from donor to implementation. A locally led humanitarian supply chain demands the leadership of local actors; the agency of local actors must be the priority for international actors.

1. Introduction

Covid-19 prompted a substantial rethink in the donor-recipient model of the humanitarian supply chain with specific reference to the allocation of humanitarian healthcare from international donors to local recipients. Limited industrial capacity brought on a fourfold crisis in Africa: a social crisis, an economic crisis, a political crisis, and more poignantly a health crisis.¹ Humanitarian responses require local actors to rely more on local than international supply chains. Localisation, therefore, offers a potential solution to the negative externalities incurred by the dominance of the global humanitarian supply chain by INGOs and their respective donors: national governments in the Global North.

Humanitarian disasters were common across Africa even before Covid-19. In East Africa, Kenya faces humanitarian challenges ranging from refugee flows from neighbouring EAC states, climate-change induced weather patterns, and high rates of tropical disease whereas states in West Africa, noticeably Nigeria, face food insecurity and resource-driven conflict. Achieving localisation is critical if humanitarian efforts are effective: minimal loss of human and financial capital within the Global South.

How we define ‘localisation,’ therefore, remains critical to design a model for the main aim of localisation: a locally led humanitarian supply chain. Localisation must be conceptualised as a ‘journey’ – that requires specific policies (means) – to reach the ‘destination’: a locally-led humanitarian supply chain. This demands policymakers to go beyond tokenistic measures – namely the relocation of business activities to regional hubs – and concentrate policy efforts to tackling on the structural inequalities that underpin international supply chains: an unequal trading relationship.

Localisation efforts differ, however, according to the social context. Successful localisation, as a model, requires an outline of what ‘full localisation looks like’ in practise. Localisation can be conceptualised as a shift in the nature of the relationship between international and local actors: a shift in power from the Global North and their recipients, otherwise termed donors in IGOs and INGOs, to central and local governments, local suppliers, and LNGOs across the Global South. Localisation practises require a shift in decision-making power measured by three policy areas: resources, capacity, and agency. Localisation can therefore be standardised into one conceptual approach defined by ‘a shift in decision-making power’ although current and future policy efforts to tackle challenges of localisation will differ according to the priorities of all four policy stakeholders

¹ Kassa and Grace, “Race against death or starvation? COVID-19 and its impact on African populations,” 11.

in different social contexts: INGOs in the Global North versus central and local governments, local suppliers, and LNGOs in the Global South.

Therefore, this report analyses localisation practises of the humanitarian supply chain on a global and national scale in fourfold: the current humanitarian situation, a conceptual approach of localisation as a process and its practises, current and future efforts to implement localisation on a global basis, and policy recommendations for localisation. Each one of these four stages will be applied to the global and national context: Kenya and Nigeria.

Localisation

Generalised definitions of ‘localisation’ converge on the transfer of power from international actors to local actors.²³ Localisation represents one response to the dependency model underscored by the financial system between the Global North and Global South. This model, between donors – those national governments in the Global North that donate to international IGOs or INGOs – and recipients, namely national governments, suppliers, and LNGOs in the Global South, has sustained the under-development of the African continent.

Discourse surrounding post-colonial thought in development theory can be sourced to rejection of neoliberal development economics and political decision-making in the Global North. Independence of ‘Third World’ countries, under European colonial rule, has given way to a current of anti-colonial discourse that centres the ‘local.’ IMF SAPs, within the Mashraq and Maghreb in the Middle East and North Africa, signalled intervention to solve supply-chain issues albeit through top-down approaches with conditionality.

Localisation: A New Phenomenon?

Post-colonial development theory can be historicised to the independence period, however, emphasis on humanitarian intervention, with a focus on ‘localising’ without conditionality, has gained traction since the end of the twentieth century. Humanitarian action, as a U.S. foreign policy tool and response to the Covid-19 pandemic, represent watershed moments within development theory.

² Davies, “Localised Development,” 2.

³ The Fritz Institute, “Humanitarian Supply Chain Management: Partnership for Localisation” (Roundtable Discussions), 24.

Humanitarian intervention has gained traction since the end of the Cold War as a U.S. foreign policy tool with reform. American leadership across IGOs, namely the WB, WHO, and IMF – through donor financing – has been reflected in IGO and INGO intervention where the failures of top-down approaches, with stringent austerity policy and democratisation procedures, has been adjusted across the IGO and INGO space. Bottom-up approaches have superseded SAPs, namely microfinance, whilst INGOs have witnessed a change in the language of development: an emphasis on ‘human dignity’ and ‘agency.’ The ‘individual’ rather than the ‘institution’ has been an increasing trend across development practise under U.S. foreign policy – irrespective of U.S. national interests – in humanitarian intervention. Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan are examples where the language of human rights has been used irrespective of the politics of such ‘development choices.’

Official publication of the ‘localisation agenda’ in 2016 – at the World Humanitarian Summit⁴ – took one step further by shifting agency to a specific type of ‘individual:’ the ‘local.’ Instead of pursuing bottom-up approaches – designed to focus on individual agency irrespective of the actor – the new agenda focussed on a shift in power to local actors. Defining localisation shifted the unit of analysis from the individual to specific individuals across three policy areas: funding, capacity, and agency. Specific localisation practises within each one of the three policy areas consist of the four localisation practises: direct cooperation with local partners, effective local partnerships, strengthening local capacity, and engagement with local communities.⁵ As such, IGOs and INGOs have started to deliver on their efforts to localise through each of these three policy areas: USAID has committed to providing 25% of its program revenues to local actors by 2025 whilst other INGOs such as UNDP, UNICEF, WHO, and Save The Children are following suit.⁶

Alternatively, Covid-19 was a catalyst for localisation efforts across all sectors, specifically the healthcare sector – namely the local manufacturing of vaccine and mRNA vaccines – however, earlier efforts signalled the push to ‘localise.’ Covid-19 demonstrated the negative externalities of a humanitarian supply chain located, funded, and conditioned by international than local actors. As such, Covid-19 has built on previous trends towards the ‘local’ across the Global South.

⁴ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise”, 46.

⁵ USAID, “Moving Toward A Model Of Locally Led Development: FY 2022 Localisation Progress Report,” 19.

⁶ USAID, “Committed to Change: USAID Localisation Progress Report FY 2023,” 5.

2. Localisation as a Model

Localisation: The Ideal Prototype

Defining ‘localisation’ remains critical to design a model for the main aim of localisation: a locally led humanitarian supply chain. Localisation must be conceptualised as a ‘journey’ – that requires specific policies – to reach the ‘destination’: a locally-led humanitarian supply chain.⁷

Localisation can be conceptualised as a shift in the nature of the relationship between international and local actors: a shift in power from the Global North and their recipients, otherwise termed donors in IGOs and INGOs, to central and local governments, local suppliers, and LNGOs across the Global South. Specifically, this relationship is inherently defined by ‘power’⁸ where the relationship during (post-)colonialism continues to be defined by inequality. Inequality of opportunity was defined under colonial rule, during European colonialism, in addition to the current nature of the international financial system. Global currency exchanges in the U.S. dollar, the dominance of trading blocs with the ‘Common External Tariff’ system, and an unfair terms of trade have defined the financial system after the Second World War.

Therefore, power is central to understanding ‘localisation’ because power has and continues to undermine the process of building a locally led humanitarian supply chain. However, power is an abstract concept that demands further refining. Power in decision-making, is a unit of analysis, that can be effectively measured against three units of analysis: resources, capacity, and agency. Each one of these three units can be achieved by localisation practises, that work towards the outcome of a locally led humanitarian supply chain.

The Importance of Power

Power is critical in localisation.⁹ The international financial system has been controlled by international actors: IGOs or INGOs funded by donor-states in the Global North and international suppliers or LNGOs co-opted by aid conditionality. Power therefore pervades three main areas of

⁷ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 5.

⁸ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 10.

⁹ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 10.

analysis: who and what is financed, who and what has the means to respond to humanitarian disasters using the appropriate quality and quantity of resources available, and how resource-allocation in addition to capacity-building is carried out alongside in local actors in a specific local context. Power, therefore, converges around the ‘decision-making’ abilities of those local actors.¹⁰

However, the journey¹¹ is as important as the destination: a locally run humanitarian supply chain. Efforts may be successful in creating a locally run supply chain, however, the means of achieving this is crucial. If power infuses the process of ‘localising’, policymakers need to consider how power is decentralised to local actors in compliance with local customs, values, and knowledge. Therefore, policymakers must allow local actors to lead the process of localisation than be subject to de facto decentralisation. As such, localisation as a process and its outcome – that is a locally-led humanitarian supply chain – must be grounded in locally-led efforts to localise and sustain such processes: local actors must play a leadership role even if international assistance is needed.

The following analytical framework provides a break-down of measuring the ‘destination’ of the ‘process’ of localisation: a locally led humanitarian supply-chain. This provides a unit of analysis for measuring the extent of ‘localisation’ achieved: how far has decision-making power shifted from international actors in the Global North to local actors in the Global South.

Therefore, there are three dimensions of a locally led humanitarian supply chain. These dimensions are reached by several localisation practises that act as levers of localisation,¹² that shift the power from international to local actors, to produce a locally led humanitarian supply chain that is led by locals in the three dimensions: funding, capacity, and agency.

The Destination: A Locally Led Humanitarian Supply Chain

Funding is crucial to measure the ‘local’ in a local humanitarian supply chain.

Measures that demonstrate local decision-making power – within the dimension of ‘funding’ – would follow specific guidelines: *availability*, *accessibility*, and *sustainability*.

¹⁰ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 11.

¹¹ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 9.

¹² Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 13.

Availability is determined by access of financial capital to local suppliers and LNGOs. As such, local actors would have full access to credit held by international actors for their own objectives. Credit is essential for procurement in the short-term and building capacity in the long run.

Accessibility would measure the extent of availability, with (-out) conditionality, local suppliers, and LNGOs have access to. Local actors would be privy to symmetric than asymmetric information vis-à-vis international actors, access funds with minimal to no transaction costs, and have limited language barriers in communication with donors and INGOs.

Sustainability planning is critical for supply-chain growth and contingency planning. Funding without conditionality – in the neo-colonial sense – requires a plan of action to invest a portion of the funds into immediate supply-chain running costs. Capital investment is needed for long-term supply-side growth and contingency planning, in the event of an external shock, requires contingency funding for local stakeholders. Sustainable investments help sustain supply-side growth to develop self-sufficiency without aid dependency.

Capacity is highly important, specifically, concerning the quantity and quality of resources. Local capacity is important vis-à-vis the quality of resource inputs since the quantity of resources intersects with funding.

Human and physical capital demand international investment via technological transfer. The skills of local labour and manufacturing base is critical to a high supply-side capacity. Transparency between international and local actors equates to effective capacity: short time-lags, vis-à-vis the speed of humanitarian relief from supply to distribution, would be the ultimate product of capacity-building by localisation.

Agency can be identified as the ability of local actors to identify their problems and design their own solutions.¹³ Ownership underpins the concept of ‘agency.’ Agency is subjective, to the individual, however, full localisation would acknowledge the role of donors as the financial guarantor although confined to an advisory role. Therefore, a locally-led humanitarian supply chain would allow local actors to make their own decisions with perfect information – concerning international-local communication – with the ability to deliver their own policy decision.

Defining agency can be understood in two-fold: agency by action and agency by discourse (‘the language of development.’) Means, otherwise considered as the policy structures in place, can be

¹³ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 12.

understood by the local actor's ability to implement policy decisions independent of any aid conditionality or top-down mechanism between international and local actor.

Agency also refers to the language of development: the framing of the relationship between international and local. The language of development is important if local actors are to implement their own concept of development following local customs, values, and traditions. Whilst notions of economic development are largely empirical, INGOs' privileging of Western ontologies and epistemologies can hinder the agency of local actors in designing policy.¹⁴ As such, ensuring that all local actors are treated equally – irrespective of their (in-)formal status¹⁵ as an institution or not – is critical to enforcing a localised agenda. Western ontological and epistemological ideas of 'development by institutions' cannot be enforced or privileged over informal humanitarian relief methods where context permits such relief.

A summary of the criteria of localisation can be read below. Overall, Figure 5 confirms that the ideal localisation effort – that produces a locally-led humanitarian supply chain – is a process that transfers resources, builds capacity, and maintains agency of all local actors.

¹⁴ Baguios et al, "Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise," 12.

¹⁵ Ibid.

Figure 1: Normative Questions for the Three Dimensions of Localisation

Dimensions of localisation:	Criteria: Measuring the extent of 'localisation.'
Resources: Are resources allocated sufficiently to local actors?	Accessibility: Are funds transferred without barriers: transaction fees or intermediaries? Availability: Do funds match local needs and preferences without time lags on transfer? Sustainability: Do funds 'cost-in' capital and contingency funding?
Capacity: Is the quality and quantity of resources being improved?	Technological transfer (IGO): Are international actors assisting in innovation (R&D)? Technological transfer (National): Is central government investing in productive capacity? Corruption: Is corruption being tackled to streamline distribution processes?
Agency: Are local actors able to have autonomy over the policy-making process?	Agency (action): Are local actors able to choose their agenda and pursue their own priorities? Agency by action: Are local actors able to lead in solutions for their own problems? Agency by discourse: Are local actors able to maintain their organisational/individual identity when engaging with international actors? Agency by discourse: Are local actors, customs, and values respected?

Therefore, policymakers should adjust their localisation practises to each of these three dimensions of localisation. Questions, for every one of the three dimensions, should be addressed if policymakers want to ensure full localisation efforts.

Models are complex versions of reality – that are simplified – and may differ to those efforts of localisation in Kenya and Nigeria. Ultimately, this model will require negotiation between international and local actors in each dimension of building a locally led humanitarian supply chain. Global efforts to achieve this are ongoing although there remains a lot to build on.


The next section outlines localisation practises on a global scale and how current efforts can be improved with reference to the previous model (Figure 1).

3. Localisation Of The Humanitarian Supply-Chain In Two Contexts

Humanitarian Challenges: East Africa

Crises and disaster risks will increase in every region because of climate change. However, certain continents – namely Africa – will be worst affected because of the combination of geophysical hazards and anthropogenic vulnerabilities. Geophysical patterns are naturally concentrated within those areas of the ITCZ; however, anthropogenic vulnerabilities make Africa particularly vulnerable to geophysical hazards. Lower-middle income countries will be the worst affected whereas higher income countries are more able to absorb increases in risk¹⁶ because of sufficient funding, supply-side capacity, and local agency.

Figure 2: Changes in risk by sub-region 2050 (pessimistic scenario: RCP8.5-SSP3)¹⁷



¹⁶ INFORM REPORT 2023: Shared evidence for managing crises and disasters, <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/Portals/0/InfoRM/2023/INFORM%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf>, 34.

¹⁷ Ibid.

Humanitarian Challenges: Kenya

One of the main humanitarian challenges affecting Kenya is food insecurity because of geophysical and anthropogenic factors. Kenya is ranked 17th most-at-risk country in the world: hazard exposure (geophysical and anthropogenic), vulnerability (socio-economic and demographic), and coping capacity (institutional and infrastructure).¹⁸ Specific geophysical vulnerabilities, accelerated by climate-change, have been worsened by issues of governance and regional conflict: corruption, unequal development, and refugee inflows. As such, drought and flooding have been the main geophysical vulnerabilities facing the East African state since independence in 1963.

Food Insecurity: Anthropogenic is Key

Drought is also an ongoing geophysical hazard in Kenya. Over the past years, Kenya has experienced the worst drought in 40 years, with five consecutive failed rainy seasons. This drought has affected 6.4 million people; 4.5 million of whom require humanitarian food assistance where the death of 2.4 million livestock has increased the vulnerability of the pastoralist communities in the arid and semi-arid lands (ASALs).¹⁹

The ASALs compose of 23 counties that face acute food insecurity rated at a ‘Crisis’ level.²⁰ The ASAL is broken-down into five clusters: Pastoral North-West, comprising of Turkana, Samburu, and Marsabit; Pastoral North-East, comprising of Wajir, Garissa, Isiola, Tana River, and Mandera; South-East Marginal Agriculture, comprising of Kitui, Makueni, Tharaka Nithi, Embu, and Meru; Coastal Marginal Agriculture, comprising of Kilifi, Kwale, Taita Taveta, and Lamu; and the Agro-pastoral cluster of Baringo, Narok, Kajiado, West Pokot, Laikipia and the northern part of Nyeri county (Kieni sub-county). The main livelihood of communities across these 5 clusters that make-


¹⁸ INFORM REPORT 2023: Shared evidence for managing crises and disasters, <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/Portals/0/InfoRM/2023/INFORM%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf>, 19.

¹⁹ WFP, “Annual Country Report: 2023,” https://www.wfp.org/operations/annual-country-report?operation_id=KE01&year=2023#/26547.

²⁰ IPC, “Kenya: IPC Food Security & Nutrition Snapshot,” https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_FoodSecurity&Nutrition_2021July2022_Jan_Snapshot.pdf.

up ASAL include Pastoralism, Agro-pastoralism, Mixed Farming, Marginal Mixed Farming, and some Irrigated Cropping.²¹

Figure 3: Current Acute Food Insecurity (July-October 2021)²²



Areas facing food insecurity, in conjunction with acute malnutrition, differ. ASAL areas in the North-West and North-East have the highest classification of current acute malnutrition contrary to ASAL counties, with food insecurity at ‘crisis’ level, yet malnutrition levels register as ‘alert.’²³ Therefore, differences between those counties affected by ‘food insecurity’ with (-out) ‘malnutrition’ highlight the prominence of insufficient health services, noticeably medical supplies,

²¹ IPC, “Kenya – ASAL,”


https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2021Jul2022Jan_Report.pdf.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

sanitation, and nutrition, caused by drought-induced events yet accentuated by human-induced factors such as governance, corruption, conflict, and technological capacity.

Figure 4: Current Acute Malnutrition Situation (July 2021)²⁴



Drought is one humanitarian challenge facing all Kenyan communities in the ASAL counties. However, those counties with added humanitarian challenges – noticeably malnutrition in the North-West and North-East of Kenya – face added humanitarian challenges because of anthropogenic factors. Examples of these anthropogenic challenges include: the implications of regional conflict in South Sudan on the price volatility of foodstuffs in North-Western counties,


²⁴ IPC, “Kenya – ASAL,”

https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2021Jul2022Jan_Report.pdf.

centralised government that grants patronage to specific political-business elites, youth unemployment, and limited supply-side capacity of foodstuffs and healthcare.²⁵

Food insecurity, noticeably flooding, has been a reoccurring pattern in Kenya because of climate change. For instance, research at Imperial College London evidence that the Indian Ocean Dipole and climate change explain the ongoing flood-inducing rainfall in East Africa.²⁶ Recent flooding, last year and this year, has been caused by the acceleration of natural cycles of weather patterns – the warming of the western Indian Ocean (Indian Dipole) – due to climate-change. Human-induced emissions are accelerating climate-change across the ITCZ in two-fold.

Figure 5: Flooding in “Long Rain Season,” Kenya (May 2024)²⁷



²⁵ VOA, “What’s behind the catastrophic rainfall in Kenya?,” <https://www.voanews.com/a/what-s-behind-the-catastrophic-rainfall-in-kenya-/7596159.html#>.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ OCHA, “Kenya: Heavy rains and flooding update,” <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/kenya/kenya-heavy-rains-and-flooding-update-flash-update-5-10-may-2024>.

Precipitation patterns in Kenya, that follow two rain seasons, are changing. Precipitation is increasing in frequency and intensity. Last year's "short rains" season (October to December) was characterised by severe storms in many parts of the country, particularly November in Lamu, Mombasa and Garissa counties,²⁸ whilst this year's "long rains" season (March to May) ended in June. All three counties received three-times their long-term average rainfall whilst the "long-rain" seasons are increasing in duration.

It is evident that geophysical hazards, in drought and flooding, are increasing in frequency and intensity in Kenya. Figures 3-5 demonstrate the severity of food insecurity, caused by climate-induced drought or precipitation patterns seen by the May floods in Kenya (Figure 4), however, Kenyans face high levels of food insecurity because of climate-induced geophysical hazards as well as those anthropogenic factors.

Trends of Localisation: Kenya

Efforts to localise in Kenya have seen momentum since 2010. Decentralisation, under the 2010 constitution, was enacted that divided the country into 47 counties.²⁹ In 2013, 47 new governors were elected and allocated government resources to oversee functions that were formally allocated to the central government.³⁰ Each of these efforts have resulted in the start of a national effort to localise before global trends in localisation were formalised by the 2016 Humanitarian Summit.

However, issues of localisation continue to come up against three core areas: funding, capacity, and partnerships. Each issue demands a solution that can be targeted by international actors across two core levels:³¹

²⁸ VOA, "What's behind the catastrophic rainfall in Kenya?" <https://www.voanews.com/a/what-s-behind-the-catastrophic-rainfall-in-kenya-/7596159.html#>.

²⁹ UKAID, "Localising Humanitarian Action: Case Studies from Uganda, Kenya, the Philippines, and India," 12.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Baguios et al, "Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise: Models, approaches, and challenges," 50.

Humanitarian Challenges: West Africa

West Africa – like East Africa – share the highest level of risk, that represent low-income regions within the African continent,³² however, the depth of localisation in addition to those anthropogenic factors – namely conflict – complicate localisation efforts to a greater extent in West Africa.

Policymakers require political will to draw attention to aid efforts, let alone aid efforts that are permitted by local actors, as an initial requirement for any localisation strategy. Conflict takes the form of; farmer-pastoralist conflict in West Africa and is one of the key manifestations of conflict in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria.³³ Climate-change and socio-political cleavages, along ethnic lines, continue to cause conflict across West Africa.

Civil conflict interrupts the localisation process, in its design phase, because identifying issues of humanitarian aid requires access to accurate information and local actors following accurate data collection. Therefore, funding and capacity-building are core issues for low-income countries – both in West and East Africa – yet West African states fail to gather the pre-requisites to undergo localisation: accurate data collection and access to distribution lines in rural communities.

West Africa has made little progress, compared to East Africa, to develop funding and capacity-building measures to target the climate-security nexus.

Humanitarian Challenges: Nigeria

Nigeria reflects two humanitarian challenges associated with West Africa: food insecurity and conflict. Nigeria has a ‘very high climate change risk’: hazard exposure (geophysical and anthropogenic), vulnerability (socio-economic and demographic), and coping capacity (institutional and infrastructure).³⁴


³² INFORM, “INFORM REPORT 2023: Shared evidence for managing crises and disasters,” 34.

³³ Shettima & Tar, “Farmer-Pastoralist Conflict in West Africa: Exploring the Causes and Consequences,” 171.

³⁴ INFORM REPORT 2023: Shared evidence for managing crises and disasters, <https://drmke.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/Portals/0/InfoRM/2023/INFORM%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf>, 19.

Anthropogenic factors, namely climate change, is the cause of drought and flooding, however, food insecurity has also been accentuated by conflict(s) in north-east, north central, the middle-belt, and north-west Nigeria.

Figure 6: IPC Acute Malnutrition levels in Nigeria (May – September 2023)³⁵



Acute malnutrition is serious to critical, as per Figure 6, in the north(-east/west) of the country where climate-induced drought limits the access to food supply and subsequent inflation. Areas of high malnutrition are clustered in the north-west and north-east of Nigeria for climate-related reasons. Lake Chad, located on the border between Nigeria and Chad in the north-east, has shrunk by 90% in the past 60 years³⁶ owing to climate change. Similarly, provinces in north-west Nigeria –

³⁵ IPC, “Northeast And Northwest Nigeria,” 2.

³⁶ VOA, “Report: Climate Change Fuelling Conflict in Lake Chad Basin,” 1.

namely Sokoto, and Katsina– are facing ‘critical’ levels of malnutrition amongst local communities.³⁷ Poor food consumption – in diversity and frequency – is responsible.

Flooding is also important in Nigeria. As of September 2018, flooding in 9 States contributed to food insecurity. The most recent flooding (July to September 2018) flooded 80% of the country³⁸ with most of the IDPs located in high flood-risk areas.³⁹

However, other anthropogenic challenges – namely terrorism and political violence – are responsible for food insecurity in the north (-east/west) of Nigeria. The insurgency of Boko Haram dominates the Borno state and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), and *Jam’tu Ablis Sunna Lidda’awati wal-Jihad* (JAS) dominate provinces in the north-east of Nigeria by the Lake Chad Basin whilst political violence, between herder-shepherd communities in pastoral communities, complicates the supply of food in the north-west.

The climate-security nexus is evident in Nigeria. Political violence also persists in the south, namely Biafra, yet food insecurity is concentrated in the northern regions where the supply of food is ‘critical’ because of human-induced drought unlike the wetlands in the south of Nigeria.⁴⁰ Therefore, climate change destabilises the supply of foodstuffs in the northern provinces in addition to the ‘Middle Belt’⁴¹ where the competition of resources is high because of inter-communal conflict. Food insecurity generates further rounds of risk, namely a refugee crisis across all four states in the Lake Chad basin, whilst accentuating the use and longevity of violence by insurgencies and bandits in the northern and central provinces.

Issues of food insecurity caused by climate-induced and security concerns in the north of Nigeria are gendered. Humanitarian challenges converge around food insecurity although along gendered lines: women and children are the most vulnerable communities in Nigeria. The absence of the central government in the northern provinces permits non-state actors a monopoly over supplies of food and humanitarian aid that is distributed according to the interests of insurgents. Food is allocated along group lines, that is often ethnic, and allocated to men rather than women and their children.

³⁷ IPC, “Northeast And Northwest Nigeria,” 3.

³⁸ IFRC, “Mission Report: Grand Bargain Localisation Workstream Demonstrator Country Field Mission To Nigeria,” 21.

³⁹ OCHA, “Nigeria: Situation Report,” 17.

⁴⁰ IPC, “Northeast and Northwest Nigeria,” 2.

⁴¹ Wilson Centre, “Insecurity and Militancy in the Middle Belt of Nigeria,” 1.

It is estimated that nearly 4.4 million children aged 0-59 months continue to suffer from acute malnutrition up until April 2024.⁴²

Conflict also generates gendered-based violence (GBV) against women who are often victims of violence by non-state actors. UNFPA Nigeria⁴³ reported that the incidence of GBV is growing because of the insurgency in the Northeast. The lack of opportunities increases cases of forced marriages as well as the physical, mental, and sexual assault of women.⁴⁴

Trends of Localisation: Nigeria

Efforts to localise the humanitarian supply chain – concerning foodstuffs, assistance to IDPs, and victims of GBV – is ongoing since 2016 albeit lopsided in approach. The national humanitarian response is focussed on Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa (BAY) states of the northeast rather than the northwest.

Figure 7: A state map of Nigeria showing the north-east/west states⁴⁵



⁴² IPC, “Northeast and Northwest Nigeria,” 1.

⁴³ UNFPA Nigeria, “Gender-based violence,” 1.

⁴⁴ UNFPA Nigeria, “Gender-based violence,” 1.

⁴⁵ Bryant, Ibrahim, and Obono, “Aid beyond politics and according to need: Overcoming disparities in humanitarian responses in Nigeria,” 12.

Therefore, the approach to localising the supply-chain – at a national level – disproportionately focuses on the north-east – because of the political framing of Boko Haram as a ‘terrorist insurgency’ – than in the north-west where political violence also exists although it is defined as ‘banditry.’⁴⁶ The politicisation of civil conflict in the northeast, contrary to the northwest, has implications for localisation as efforts continue to focus on those BAY states.

There are additional inequalities between the regions of focus. In the northeast, there is significant attention by humanitarian actors on Borno state rather than neighbouring Yobe and Adamawa. Within Borno state, programming is concentrated in the Maiduguri metropolis, neglecting areas such as Bama, a product of limited rural access and the region’s political power.⁴⁷

Since 2016, bi/multilateral efforts have accelerated although slow. Bilateral efforts include the FCDO’s Project Lafiya following the Grand Bargain of 2016.⁴⁸ The FCDO has encouraged the Nigerian government to increase resources in the supply of healthcare and access to contraception: two factors that have sustained the detrimental impacts of food insecurity and GBV through conflict in Nigeria.

INGO and IGO efforts have predated bi/multi-lateral efforts with the establishment of the Nigeria INGO Forum (NIF) in 2014⁴⁹ and successive UN-led initiatives the WFP, UNICEF, NORCAP, and UNFPA⁵⁰ projects. NIF allowed INGOs such as Action Aid Nigeria (AAN), Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF),⁵¹ and Christian Aid Nigeria to focus efforts on BAY states through the Accelerating Localisation Through Partnerships framework (ALTP),⁵² whilst UN initiatives have

⁴⁶ Bryant, Ibrahim and Obono, “Aid beyond politics and according to need: Overcoming disparities in humanitarian responses in Nigeria,” 19.

⁴⁷ IFRC, “Key Observations And Findings: Understanding the Context,” 9.

⁴⁸ LAMP Development, <https://lampdevelopment.org/project/lafiya-uk-support-for-health-in-nigeria/>.

⁴⁹ Reliefweb, “Nigeria INGO Forum,” <https://reliefweb.int/organization/nif>.

⁵⁰ UNFPA, “Gender-based violence,” <https://nigeria.unfpa.org/en/node/6123>.

⁵¹ Healy et al, “Working with local actors: MSF’s approach,” <https://odihpn.org/publication/working-with-local-actors-msf/>.

⁵² Backhurst et al, “Podcast: A conversation on the ‘Accelerating Localisation Through Partnerships’ programme,” <https://odihpn.org/publication/podcast-a-conversation-on-the-accelerating-localisation-through-partnerships-programme/>.

targeted the environmental crisis in Lake Chad (NORCAP)⁵³ and GBV under the Child Protection Area of Responsibility (CP AoR) in NE Nigeria led by the Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development (MWASD) and UNICEF.⁵⁴

⁵³ NRC, “Evaluation Terms of Reference Tools Development for NORCAP Lake Chad Basin Localisation & Capacity Building Project,” 1.

⁵⁴ CP AoR, Protection Cluster, and UNICEF, “Northeast Nigeria CP AoR Localisation Strategy,” 2.

4. Practises: Global

Two Levels: International Actors of Localisation

GOVERNMENTAL

- I. Bilateral – national government led (USAID or FCDO).
- II. Multilateral – numerous national governments collaborate (Grand Bargain).

INTERMEDIARIES: IGOs & INGOs

- III. IGOs – Inter-Governmental Organisations including UNICEF, WFP, and IOM.
- IV. INGOs – International Non-Governmental Organisations such as Kenyan Christian Aid.

Current Efforts: Localisation Practises – Bilateral & Multilateral

The Bilateral: two core examples of bilateral assistance include US and UK national government strategies: USAID⁵⁵ and FCDO.⁵⁶

Current efforts by DAC countries are improving yet practises remain highly limited. These efforts focus on financial aid from aid budgets of national governments in the Global North to CSOs. According to recent data from the OECD, total ODA provided by DAC countries has increased by 3.5% (in real terms) to reach 161.2bn (US\$). Funding to Global South actors is increasing although it remains relatively minor compared to aid flows from national governments to other local actors in the Global North.

⁵⁵ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 40.

⁵⁶ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 39.

USAID – Localisation: USAID is the largest bilateral donor agency, within the Global North, to introduce a funding target and initiative to ‘localise’ its operations.⁵⁷

- *Forward reform initiative (2010-2016):* focussed on sustainable development through high-impact partnerships and local solutions. This initiative led to the establishment of the Local Solutions initiative, which aimed to shift program implementation from U.S.-based to partner-country organisations. Consequently, the initiative set a target of 30% of direct funding from Missions to local institutions by 2015.
 - The 30% target was not met; however, USAID almost doubled its programme funds from 9.7% (2010) to 18.6% (2015)

- *Local Works (2015):* created to provide five-year discretionary funding for USAID Missions to work directly with local and non-traditional partners. There are 32 USAID Missions with Local Works programmes across the Global South.⁵⁸
 - USAID defined ‘locally led development’ as the process that local actors – encompass individuals, communities, networks, organisations, private entities, and governments – to set their own agendas.

 - This work was supported with INGOs, namely Oxfam and Save the Children, to measure the impact of Local Works 2015 through the Local Engagement Assessment Framework.

⁵⁷ USAID, “Committed to Change: USAID Localisation Progress Report FY 2023,” 5.

⁵⁸ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 39.

- *New Partnership Initiative (2019)*: aims to diversify USAID’s partner base by removing barriers to engagement and create new avenues for partners to improve issues of availability and access.⁵⁹
 - The New Partnership extended localisation efforts from 2015, where the NEI aimed to allow local organisations to become agents of supply-chain projects, rather than implement projects onto LINGOs with limited local knowledge.

- *Acquisition and Assistance Strategy (2021-23)*: USAID announced two localisation targets in pursuit of localisation goals.⁶⁰
 - A) 2025: USAID will direct a quarter of its funding directly to local partners.
 - B) 2030: USAID will direct a half of its funding directly to local partners.

- As part of the USAID A&A strategy, USAID have implemented four core practises that coincide with USAID funding targets on localisation:⁶¹
 - A. Work with Local Partners
 - B. Effective Local Partnerships
 - C. Local Capacity
 - D. Engagement with Communities

⁵⁹ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 40.

⁶⁰ USAID, “Committed to Change: USAID Localisation Progress Report FY 2023,” 18.

⁶¹ USAID, “Localisation: Catalysing and Supporting Local Change,” 19.

FCDO – Localisation: The FCDO does not have an official policy on localisation, yet it funds initiatives that help with funding, specifically capacity-building, and supporting agential-development across the humanitarian supply chain.⁶²

- *Grand Bargain:* the UK is an active player and signatory in the Grand Bargain. It convenes Workstream 3 and the WFP on increasing the use and coordination of cash assistance.
 - The UK provides more than 90% of humanitarian aid as multi-year funding and was also the largest donor to OCHA.
 - The UK introduced a Rapid Response Facility allocation of 18million (£)
- *Challenge Funds:* a financing mechanism that uses competition among organisations to allocate funds for specific purposes by open call.
 - Example of Challenge Fund: includes 1999-2007 project that disbursed 18.5 million (£) via this mechanism; aim was to broaden and deepen access to financial services across Africa and South Asia
 - 28 Projects were funded in 12 countries including early stage of M-Pesa in Kenya
 - Amplify Challenge Fund: set-up to help grant loans to LINGOs routinely without access to funding from government donors.

⁶² Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 40-41.

The Multilateral: the main efforts for multilateralism include the Grand Bargain Commitment (2016).

Multilateral efforts to localise are epitomised by the latest multilateral agreement – termed the ‘Grand Bargain’ – that actions humanitarian assistance among some of the largest donors and humanitarian organisations on locally-led development and harmonisation approaches.⁶³

Under the World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul in May 2016, representatives of 18 donor countries and 16 international aid organisations from the UN, INGOs, and the RCRCM agreed a ‘Grand Bargain.’ This outlined 51 policy commitments aimed at improving the efficacy and efficiency of international humanitarian aid, that included a voluntary annual reporting mechanism, supported by an annual independent review, to monitor the implementation of each commitment.⁶⁴

Since inception, the Grand Bargain has made considerable progress on *funding, capacity, and agency*:⁶⁵

- I. Donor *funding*: number of signatories allocating 25% or more of their humanitarian funds to national and local responders (5 signatories, 2017 to 13 signatories, 2020)
- II. Donor *funding*: cash assistance programmes have increased (three largest humanitarian agencies provided 3.04bn (US\$) of cash in 2020).
- III. *Streamlining* operations: signatories are using the ‘8+3 reporting template’ in some form (14 in 2019 to 28 in 2020) and focus of operations more strategised (51 original commitments, 11 core commitments, and 2 enabling priorities).
- IV. *Agency*: gender equality and female empowerment integrated across 100% signatory activities.

⁶³ HPG, “The Grand Bargain at five years: An independent review,” 17.

⁶⁴ HPG, “The Grand Bargain at five years: An independent review,” 17.

⁶⁵ Metcalfe-Hough et al, “The Grand Bargain at five years,” 31.

Future Efforts: Recommendations (Bilateral & Multilateral)

Bilateral efforts have been successful in scaling-up national funding to LNGOs on a global basis. Africa has been one of the key geographies that has witnessed this shift. NGOs continue to benefit from the USAID's A&A strategy whilst FCDO efforts have concentrated humanitarian efforts to building capacity. M-Pesa, in East Africa,⁶⁶ shows that funding matters but access, availability, and how this translates to the ability to buy and improve physical/human capital is critical.

Recommendation 1 (Bilateral): Approach to Localisation (Outcomes than Process)

Government development agencies must focus on the systematic way of 'doing localisation' – regarding agency – rather than confining government efforts to technical expertise.

- USAID and the FCDO must focus on also measuring the outcomes of localisation practises to avoid an indicator-based approach.

Recommendation 2 (Bilateral): Systematic Change (Agency)

Qualitative dimensions of localisation, noticeably 'agency,' matter if the supply-chain is to be truly locally led. Systems and cultural change – within government agencies matter – where the hiring of native development practitioners and expansion of empowerment efforts matter.

- National development agencies need to integrate than 'add-on' the perspectives and priorities of the local community.
- Establish a hiring process that encompasses local staff with local knowledge.
- Enforce 'Diversity & Inclusion' training across hired staff to eliminate systemic racism.

⁶⁶ Baguios et al, "Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise," 40.

Recommendation 3 (Bilateral): Rethinking Competition-Based Models

FCDO use of Competition-Based models for funding are incompatible with access to funding.⁶⁷

- Rethink mechanisms of funding that introduce competition into the methodology of selecting local organisations and projects to fund; often leads to a misallocation of resources to organisations and projects with sufficient capacity and funding to write grant proposals and are not in hardship relative to those in most need.
- Prioritise modes of funding that maximise the allocation of resources on need: pooling resources with other agencies, INGOs, and UN agencies. Examples include those recommendations called under the Grand Bargain:
 - Pooled funds (minimising the need for actors to apply across multiple donors).
 - Partner funding (only one layer of transactions between the donor and local actor: predicated on a fair partnership between the initial funding recipient and local actor).
 - Delegated cooperation (a donor delegates authority to a lead donor to act on its behalf to administer funds).

Recommendation 4 (Multilateral): Increase outreach to local actors using politics.

Multilateralism must continue to build on the ‘Grand Bargain’ initiative to improve, coordinate, and collaborate across international actors to maintain the currency of the localisation agenda. Actors must use multilateral functions – the G7, G20, Paris Accords, and UN functions – to lobby actors in the Global North to increase North-South funding. Funding gaps – between funds allocated to other recipients in the Global North, than the Global South – is significant.⁶⁸

Lobbying to re-calibrate Global North funding towards the Global South could include highlighting the geopolitical importance of funding to national and LNGO actors. Multilateralism requires incentives to allocate funding to the Global South where funding can reap geopolitical influence in the African continent even without conditionality.

⁶⁷ Davies, “Localised Development,” 6.

⁶⁸ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 20.

- Actionable recommendations include:
 - Document the funding gaps and specific details of funds allocated by Global North actors to other actors in the Global North to highlight the disparity.
 - Highlight the geopolitical relevance of 'localisation' for actors in the Global North
 - Leverage political tactics to enable negotiation and compromise across signatory groups with the backing of INGOs and LNGOs

Current Efforts: Localisation Practises – INGOs & IGOs

INGOs and IGOs act as in-between institutions for bilateral and multilateral efforts – by national governments – and their recipients: N/LNGOs. The ‘Start Fund’ is the prime example of localisation efforts where INGOs serve as intermediaries between donor and recipient: the N/LNGO.⁶⁹ IGOs are also intermediaries yet IGOs devolve localisation practises to UN agencies. The UNHCR, UNOCHA, and WFP confirm this.

INGOs: the main example of INGO efforts to localise focus on the pooling of resources under the ‘Start Fund.’

The ‘Start Fund’ (2014) is a funding pool for national governments and their respective efforts at a multilateral level. As such, funds are pooled into one pot – the Start Fund – to respond to crises. Since the Humanitarian Summit, progress has been made on localisation.

Pooling Resources – Achievements thus far include the following policy commitments:

- Available Funding: 50% of Start Fund grants are implemented by national NGOs (WHS, 2016).⁷⁰
- Collaboration between INGOs & LNGOs is fostered without decentralisation.

Decentralisation – Achievements by INGO members, independent of pool funding, include:

Streamlining of funding mechanisms via pool funding:

- Oxfam: Novib Partnerships include decentralisation of operations to increase several dimensions of localisation:⁷¹
- Local accountability to partners
- Focus on fragile states: more knowledge of local context
- Diversification of income base through localising (accessing national donor funds)
- Streamlining strategy: programme work in each country together under single management strategy.

⁶⁹ Patel & Van Brabant, “The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions,” 22.

⁷⁰ Patel & Van Brabant, “The Start Fund, Start Network and Localisation: current situation and future directions,” 22.

⁷¹ Oxfam, “Oxfam Novib & Partnerships,” 21.

IGOs: allocation of funds, from donor countries to the UN, to decentralised agencies namely UNOCHA, UNWFP, and UN

○ Pooling Resources (Funding/Capacity): UN OCHA operates a series of CBPFs to allow donors to pool contributions into a single and unearmarked funds to support local humanitarian efforts.⁷²

- CBPFs: largest channel of international humanitarian funding to local actors.
- CBPFs: increased funding by two-thirds since 2015.

⁷² Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 41.

Future Efforts: Recommendations (INGOs & IGOs)

Recommendation 1: Ensure full data transparency of ‘Donor-INGO-LNGO’ funds:⁷³

- Transparency on the % of ‘passed through’ intermediary channels & the % ‘up taken’ by all relevant intermediaries from the donor to N/LNGO.

Recommendation 2: Aim to move away from ‘intermediation’ as a model of communication, cooperation, and partnership between INGOs and LNGOs:

- Pooled Funds & IGOs need to aim for ‘disintermediation:’ intermediary layers reduce the initial injection of funds designated for humanitarian relief. In turn, this has a large opportunity cost on funding, capacity, and undermines concept of local agency.
 - Reduction in the use of intermediaries in financial leakage is crucial although cooperation on technological transfer is vital. Partnerships should not be ‘tied to financial profit’ for INGOs/IGOs.
 - Prioritise ‘Quality Funding:’ limit number of intermediaries to maximise ‘direct funding’, in a flexible way, that covers a long-time period.

Recommendation 3: Role of N/LNGOs on advisory boards – that overlook - governance – needs to be balanced between INGOs, UN agencies, and respective L/NNGOs:

- CBPFs must include N/LNGOs on advisory boards concerning ‘donor-funded’ projects to ensure representation of local actors in decision-making process.

⁷³ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 13.

Recommendation 4: Inclusion of N/LNGOs at the executive level.

- CBFPs must include N/LNGOs on advisory boards concerning ‘donor-funded’ projects to ensure representation of local actors in decision-making process.

Summary: Localisation Practises

Funding, Capacity, and Agency

Efforts across both layers – at the bi- and multi-lateral in addition to intermediary – are making considerable progress in localisation.

At the bilateral level, USAID has focussed on resource allocation and capacity-building, via the availability, access, and sustainability of funding mechanisms, that has been re-affirmed by the FCDO’s enabling of electronic banking systems in countries such as Kenya. Future efforts need to engage with ‘agency’ to implement systematic changes to the way development is done rather than focussing on top-down mechanisms – that are critical – albeit limited to the means of localisation as a process rather than its outcome: a locally-led humanitarian supply chain. Empowering local actors, during the decision-making process and after, is critical to fully localise.

Similarly at the multilateral level, the ‘Grand Bargain’ initiative has accelerated USAID and FCDO’s localisation level bilaterally although their practises were already in place before 2016. Future efforts to sustain localisation momentum include constant monitoring of development agencies’ scores by multilateral initiatives in addition to political pressure on signatories that have not enforced localisation targets or non-signatories with a substantial percentage of development funding.

For intermediaries, INGOs and IGOs continue to maximise the allocation of resources to local actors via pooling mechanisms and the relocation to recipient countries. However, any mechanisms of pooled funding – namely CBFPs – need to incorporate measures to empower local agents. Measures that appoint N/LNGOs to executive positions of CBFPs would shape the way these mechanisms are designed, their beneficiaries, and outcomes. More importantly, the culture of allocating funds – regarding the extent of consultations with local actors – would change if local actors have access to shaping policy before it is decided. Another measure would include ‘Quality Funding’ where any funding limits intermediary partners, maximises the funding period, and limits transaction fees. In doing so, issues around pooling mechanisms that have multiple intermediary partners before ‘becoming local’ would be reduced. Therefore, global efforts to adopt localisation

continue to make progress across the two sets of actors involved in the shift of power to local actors, however, efforts to localise demand adjustments to reach a locally led humanitarian supply chain.

5. Recommendations: A Locally Led Humanitarian Supply Chain

Global Efforts

Recommendation 1: Understanding ‘Localisation’ through ‘Power.’

- International actors must adopt a standardised definition of ‘localisation’ that goes beyond technical language of development and embodies the reason why international actors dominate decision-making in development: political and economic dependency.
- Power is critical to defining the ‘localisation’ process as a remedy for the actions of the Global North during and after colonialism. Agency must be at the forefront of localisation efforts in addition to funding and capacity.

Recommendation 2: Focus on ‘localising resources’ for all signatories of the ‘Grand Bargain’ and maintain political pressure on non-signatories of the ‘Grand Bargain.’

- Localisation of resources – specifically funding – has seen remarkable success with USAID and FCDO efforts to meet 30% targets (2030). However, funding remains the immediate structural barrier to ‘localise’ since funding precedes any means of capacity-building and discussions on ‘agency.’ Setting higher targets of quality (multi-year, flexible, and covers core costs).⁷⁴
- International actors must re-balance the allocation of funds to local actors in the Global North to the Global South. USAID’s commitment to localisation funding means that US government political influence – together with its closest allies, namely the UK, as a signatory to the WHS – can leverage diplomatic influence to increase the number of signatories of the WHS and funding policies.

⁷⁴ Baguios et al, “Are we there yet? Localisation as the journey towards locally led practise,” 51.

Recommendation 3: Systematic Change to the Approach to Localisation

- Integrating ‘agency’ within development efforts, noticeably funding decisions, must be a priority across all international actors. Agency needs to be conceptualised by all international actors in terms of the way decision-making is approached, the shaping of decisions, and their implementation.

Recommendation 4: Streamlining of operations that inhibit the decision-making power of local actors in all three dimensions.

- Bilateral use of competition-based mechanisms, to allocate donor funding, should be abandoned because of the nature of allocation.
 - Funding should be allocated upon need than merit as ‘meritocracy’ is not applicable in social contexts where structural constraints are high. Competition-based mechanisms seem sound, in approach, but segment further underdevelopment within disadvantaged communities: local actors.
- Pooling mechanisms also demand reform: the allocation of funding must eliminate excess intermediaries.
 - INGOs and IGOs must eliminate organisational slack between donor and recipient to maximise the % of funding allocated to the local recipient whilst also ensuring that local actors feel empowered to decide where best funding is allocated.
 - Technical assistance, concerning technical advice and technological transfer, should continue in conjunction to disintermediation to ensure that funding is allocated to best practises without intruding on the agency of local actors. Trust of international actors is the core barrier to disintermediation. Therefore, having conditions in place to support local decision-making is key whilst making sure that international actors are confident that donor-funds are being used properly.

Regional Efforts: East Africa

Efforts, across East Africa, focus on solving the humanitarian challenges facing the region that correlate with the structural issues of the humanitarian supply-chain.

Recommendation 1: Regional Integration across the East African Community.

- Economic integration intersects with political integration. EAC integration must continue to emphasise local economic development as a means of facilitating localisation.⁷⁵
 - Emphasis on ‘decentralisation’ of power to regional and local leadership is key to identifying and leveraging natural, human, and infrastructural resources that demand investment by potential donors: national governments, IGOs, and INGOs.

Recommendation 2: Multilateral efforts of conflict-resolution in regional hotspots.

- USAID and the FCDO must continue to liaise with its global partners to bring about renewed dialogue for conflict-resolution in Somalia, Sudan, and Ethiopia. Conflict remains a barrier to localisation of the supply-chain: the scale of humanitarian disasters, trusting local actors, and logistics. Humanitarian disasters, namely acute food insecurity across East Africa, demand resolution of their root-cause to lower the demand for humanitarian relief via supply-chain efforts.
 - Trust between international and local actors can be improved by solving issues of corruption, that stem from unequal and unfair practises of resource-allocation and can be solved by strengthening governance at the national, regional, and local level. Conflict resolution would also help improve the distribution of humanitarian aid held up within supply-chains because of the high cost of transportation amidst security concerns across ungoverned and contested territories.

⁷⁵ CLGF, “Local economic development at centre of EAC integration, <https://www.clgf.org.uk/whats-new/news/local-economic-development-at-the-grassroots-of-eac-integration/>.”

National Efforts: Kenya

Recommendations at the national effort align with resource efficiency, capacity-building, and agency for local actors.

Recommendation 1: Decentralised Integration.⁷⁶

- Multisectoral technical working groups are needed at different tiers of administration starting from the ‘national’ to ‘county’ and finally the sub-county levels. This jumpstarts the process of having a local body steering the localisation of humanitarian supply chains in Kenya by addressing needs at every tier of response.

Recommendation 2: Coordinated ecosystem needs evaluation and action planning.⁷⁷

- The joint technical working groups, at every level, demand the coordination of the proposed specific evaluation and action such as integrating supply databases and defining standards of practise.

Recommendation 3: Resource capacity development.⁷⁸

- After evaluation, the definition of foundational structures, and capacity needs; the steering groups shall provide recommendations for resource capacity development plans at each tier as designed to be most applicable.

⁷⁶ The Fritz Institute, “Executive Summary: Humanitarian Supply Chain Management,” 24.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

Regional Efforts: West Africa

Efforts, across West Africa, focus on solving the structural issues that continue to limit the supply of humanitarian aid across the region: food insecurity and conflict.

Recommendation 1: Regional Integration across the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

- ECOWAS must continue efforts to integrate through political, economic, and social integration.⁷⁹
 - Political dialogue on solving cross-border disputes between pastoral communities, namely Lake Chad, must be prioritised. Political dialogue on climate-change must be prioritised.
 - Economic integration through intra-bloc trade, through the reduction of NTBs, must also be discussed to resolve inflated and volatile prices of foodstuffs.
 - Discussions by national governments on visa-free travel must also be discussed to improve people-to-people interaction.

Recommendation 2: Multi-lateral cooperation on de-radicalisation; the youth population within the Lake Chad Basin.

- The Nigerian government, in collaboration with IGOs and INGOs, must provide education initiatives and microfinance opportunities to the youth population to minimise the appeal of joining insurgent groups in North-West and North-East Nigeria. Minimising the incentives for radicalisation helps improve access to monitor data and distribute humanitarian aid to communities dealing with climate-induced drought in the north-east.

⁷⁹ Arushi, “Regional integration in West Africa: the evolution of ECOWAS,” 11.

- Youth inclusion⁸⁰ in decision-making is crucial to eliminate local insurgent groups in Nigeria driven by a lack of food and security where recruitment offers ‘security.’ Integrating young people’s priorities into localisation practises to facilitate their political, economic, and social inclusion is critical. Actors include neighbouring countries of the Lake Chad Basin: Nigeria, Chad, Cameroon, and Niger. A multilateral forum, within ECOWAS, may be a useful forum for dialogue.

⁸⁰ Alozie, “Youth Inclusion in the Lake Chad Basin: four key barriers,” 1.

National Efforts: Nigeria

Recommendations at the national level suggest changes to the funding strategy at the national and local level to address the immediate challenges of the conflict-climate nexus: the core barrier to any localisation efforts in Nigeria.

Recommendation 1: Rebalancing donor funding and PR strategy from the North-East to the North-West provinces.

- IGO and INGOs must focus their funds on all areas experiencing food insecurity and conflict:
 - The Nigerian government, ECOWAS states, the UN, and relevant INGOs must draw attention to the climate-security nexus and its relevance in the North-West provinces to increase funding for localisation practises in the North-West⁸¹. IGOs and INGOs have a limited presence in NW Nigeria.

Recommendation 2: Increase quantity and quality of funding to LNGOs in localisation strategies related to Child Protection (CP).

- IGOs and INGOs must increase ‘quality funding’ – specifically ‘direct funding’ – to advance localisation efforts in NE Nigeria:⁸²
 - IGOs and INGOs must limit project-based and short-term (sub-contracting) methods of funding to LNGOs (direct funding only 14% of total CP funding in 2022).⁸³

⁸¹ CP AOR, “Northeast Nigeria CP AOR Localisation Strategy,” 8.

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Alozie, “Youth Inclusion in the Lake Chad Basin: four key barriers,” 1.

Recommendation 3: Cross-Border Engagement on Climate-Induced Hazards.

- The Nigerian government, with IGO partners, must target the source of insecurity in NE Nigeria at source:
 - Actors should invest in cross-border locations to support agropastoral practises, conservation and fishery production, land management, and the improvement of cross-border trade. Opportunity of pastoral land practises is key to building capacity of local industry at source to limit conflict & mitigate against drought.⁸⁴

⁸⁴ UNDP, “Lake Chad Basin And Liptako-Gourma Regions,” 18.

6. Conclusion

This report has set-out the journey to a locally led humanitarian supply chain. Reaching the destination requires a roadmap to implement ‘the local.’ This roadmap has three dimensions – that is funding, capacity, and agency – each of which require policymaking to shift decision-making power from international actors in the Global North to local actors in the Global South. Localisation can therefore be defined as a process that aims to transfer decision-making power from international to local actors.

Current localisation practises revolve around two pathways: bi-/multilateral efforts in addition to INGO and IGO practises. Bi-/multilateral efforts focus on funding and capacity-building whilst INGO and IGO practises revolve around pooled funding and the relocation of operations to recipient countries.

Efforts to localise on a global scale omit one core dimension: agency. Localisation must focus on sustaining past progress, using diplomacy to sustain the impetus on funding under the ‘Grand Bargain (2.0)’, however, localisation practises must also evaluate ‘how international actors do development.’ Global recommendations include regulatory inspection and executive representation – at the board level for local actors – shape policy in each stage of policymaking. Representation, inclusion, and feedback must be integrated into the entirety of humanitarian supply-chain management from the decision to allocate funds from the donor to the recipient. Agency must be used to drive systemic change in the mechanisms and outcomes of localisation.

Within East Africa, efforts to build on previous integration across the EAC demand further attention by regional actors with the influence to shape policy in EAC. Candidates include Washington, Beijing, and Abu Dhabi who could help drive EAC integration to promote economic and political integration. Instability, pertaining to regional conflict and subsequent refugee outflows, complicate localisation efforts vis-à-vis the availability, access, and sustainable use of funds in addition to supply-side capacity.

Specifically, cases within East Africa – noticeably Kenya – should consider regional recommendations considering refugee flows from neighbouring conflict hotspots although recommendations collected from primary data recommend three plans of actions: decentralised integration, coordinated ecosystem, and resources capacity development. Each of the three recommendations intersect with the three dimensions of localisation: identifying resource-needs via decentralised integration at every governance level, streamlining operations of the ecosystem to increase capacity, and recommending further plans of action to increase capacity at every tier of the local supply chain.

In West Africa, however, the structural issues like those in East Africa – namely food insecurity caused by drought and flooding – are widespread and severe in duration. As such, the barriers to localising the humanitarian supply chain require a more primitive approach to localisation in Nigeria than in Kenya because funding and capacity-building measures are already being implemented in Kenya than Nigeria. Funding, at a national and local level, demands action in Nigeria before issues of agency can be addressed within the humanitarian supply chain.

Supply-chains require funding and capacity to operate, to scale up the supply of relief to communities affected by natural disasters, however, the way policy-makers scale-up the supply of humanitarian relief is fundamental if policymakers are to make humanitarian supply-chain truly 'local' from donor to implementation. A locally led humanitarian supply chain demands the leadership of local actors; the agency of local actors must be the priority for international actors.

Appendix

- Figure 1– Kingsley-Anderson, Angus. “Normative Questions for the Three Dimensions of Localisation.” 23rd July 2024.
- Figure 2 – INFORM Report 2024. “Shared Evidence For Managing Crises and Disasters.” <https://drmkc.jrc.ec.europa.eu/inform-index/Default.aspx?aspxerrorpath=/inform-index/Portals/0/InfoRM/2023/INFORM%20Annual%20Report%202023.pdf,%2034>
- Figure 3 – IPC Report (July 2021-January 2022). “Kenya – ASAL.” https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Kenya_Acute_Food_Insecurity_Malnutrition_2021Jul2022Jan_Report.pdf. (September 2021).
- Figure 4 – IPC Report. “Northeast and Northwest Nigeria: Acute Malnutrition Situation May – September 2022 and Projections for October – December 2022 and January – April 2023.” [https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156037/?iso3=NGA#:~:text=Of%20the%2063%20LGAs%20analysed,in%20Phase%201%20\(Acceptable\)](https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details-map/en/c/1156037/?iso3=NGA#:~:text=Of%20the%2063%20LGAs%20analysed,in%20Phase%201%20(Acceptable)). (23rd November 2022).
- Figure 5 – OCHA. “Kenya: Heavy Rains and Flooding Update – Flash Update (10 May 2024).” <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/kenya/kenya-heavy-rains-and-flooding-update-flash-update-5-10-may-2024>. (10th May 2024).
- Figure 6 - IPC Report. “Northeast and Northwest Nigeria: Acute Malnutrition Situation May – September 2022 and Projections for October – December 2022 and January – April 2023.” <https://www.ipcinfo.org/ipc-country-analysis/details->

[map/en/c/1156037/?iso3=NGA#:~:text=Of%20the%2063%20LGAs%20analysed,in%20Phase%201%20\(Acceptable\).](map/en/c/1156037/?iso3=NGA#:~:text=Of%20the%2063%20LGAs%20analysed,in%20Phase%201%20(Acceptable).) (23rd November 2022).

- Figure 7 - Bryant, John, Ibrahim, Aishat, and Obono, Etom. “Aid beyond politics and according to need: Overcoming disparities in humanitarian responses in Nigeria.” https://odi.org/documents/9060/HPG_NEEM_Nigeria_aid_prioritisation_final_KOvrC5H.pdf (May 2024).

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